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Summary
Background There is a scarcity of evidence about the role of patient choice and hospital competition policies on 
surgical cancer services. Previous evidence has shown that patients are prepared to bypass their nearest cancer centre 
to receive surgery at more distant centres that better meet their needs. In this national, population-based study we 
investigated the effect of patient mobility and hospital competition on service configuration and technology adoption 
in the National Health Service (NHS) in England, using prostate cancer surgery as a model.
Methods We mapped all patients in England who underwent radical prostatectomy between Jan 1, 2010, and 
Dec 31, 2014, according to place of residence and treatment location. For each radical prostatectomy centre we 
analysed the effect of hospital competition (measured by use of a spatial competition index [SCI], with a score of 0 
indicating weakest competition and 1 indicating strongest competition) and the effect of being an established robotic 
radical prostatectomy centre at the start of 2010 on net gains or losses of patients (difference between number of 
patients treated in a centre and number expected based on their residence), and the likelihood of closing their radical 
prostatectomy service.
Findings Between Jan 1, 2010, and Dec 31, 2014, 19 256 patients underwent radical prostatectomy at an NHS provider in 
England. Of the 65 radical prostatectomy centres open at the start of the study period, 23 (35%) had a statistically 
significant net gain of patients during 2010–14. Ten (40%) of these 23 were established robotic centres. 37 (57%) of the 
65 centres had a significant net loss of patients, of which two (5%) were established robotic centres and ten (27%) 
closed their radical prostatectomy service during the study period. Radical prostatectomy centres that closed were more 
likely to be located in areas with stronger competition (highest SCI quartile [0·87–0·92]; p=0·0081) than in areas with 
weaker competition. No robotic surgery centre closed irrespective of the size of net losses of patients. The number of 
centres performing robotic surgery increased from 12 (18%) of the 65 centres at the beginning of 2010 to 39 (71%) of 
55 centres open at the end of 2014.
Interpretation Competitive factors, in addition to policies advocating centralisation and the requirement to do 
minimum numbers of surgical procedures, have contributed to large-scale investment in equipment for robotic 
surgery without evidence of superior outcomes and contributed to the closure of cancer surgery units. If quality 
performance and outcome indicators are not available to guide patient choice, these policies could threaten health 
services’ ability to deliver equitable and affordable cancer care.
Funding National Institute for Health Research.
Copyright © The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an Open Access article under the CC BY-NC-ND 
4.0 license.
Introduction
The centralisation of complex cancer surgery into fewer, 
high-volume units is occurring across Europe, the USA, 
and Canada, guided by evidence that centres that carry 
out a high volume of surgical procedures have better 
outcomes of care for patients than do centres that carry 
out a low volume of surgical procedures.1–3 At the same 
time, patient choice and hospital competition policies 
have been introduced in several countries4–7—and are 
under consideration in others8—with the aim of 
improving the responsiveness and efficiency of health 
services delivered. In health-care systems where hospitals 
compete on quality and not on price, competition is also 
expected to incentivise improvements in the quality of 
hospital services to attract patients.9
Choice and competition, as well as centralisation, 
attempt to achieve improvements in patient outcomes, 
but they require different health-system configurations 
and provider incentives to operate effectively. Finding the 
right balance between choice and competition on the one 
hand and centralisation on the other is therefore key, but 
there is little evidence to guide how best to achieve this.10
The UK National Health Service (NHS) is an example of 
a health system that remains committed to choice and 
competition as a health-care reform model since the 
inception of this model in 2006.11 The cost of providing 
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services is fixed under a national rate tariff scheme12 and 
hospitals are expected to compete for patients on the basis 
of quality. Receiving care incurs no additional user charges 
at the point of access and patients have the right to choose 
and travel to any hospital that best meets their needs.
Additionally, national policy in the UK continues to 
advocate centralisation of specialist cancer services such 
as prostate and oesophagogastric surgery.13–16 Not only 
does this serve to reduce the number of hospitals that 
patients with cancer can choose from, but it is also 
expected that patients will receive care at their nearest 
(local) centre on the basis of established secondary care 
referral pathways for specialist cancer surgery.17
However, our 2017 analysis18 found that not all 
patients are following the expected referral patterns for 
specialised cancer surgery. One in three men who had a 
radical prostatectomy for prostate cancer between 2010 
and 2014 in the NHS travelled beyond or bypassed their 
nearest prostate cancer surgery centre, in many cases 
across regional boundaries. This observation especially 
applied to younger, fitter, and more affluent men than 
to older, less fit, and less affluent counterparts. In the 
absence of indicators that accurately reflect the quality 
of prostate cancer surgery, men were attracted to 
centres offering robot-assisted radical prostatectomy or 
centres that employed surgeons with a national 
reputation for prostate cancer surgery.
There is little evidence about what effect patient 
mobility and hospital competition have had on the 
configuration of specialist cancer services and the 
introduction of new surgical technologies into clinical 
practice. We used patient-level data and geographical 
information system modelling to analyse the effect of 
patient mobility for cancer surgery and hospital 
competition on service configuration and technology 
adoption within the NHS, using prostate cancer as a 
model. In light of our findings, we appraised the 
international evidence exploring the role of choice and 
competition policies on the delivery of cancer surgery 
services and considered opportunities for developing 
the empirical research base in this area.
Methods
Patient population 
For this national, population-based study we obtained 
individual patient-level data from the National Cancer 
Registration and Analysis Service (NCRAS) for all men 
who were diagnosed with prostate cancer and 
underwent a radical prostatectomy in the NHS in 
England between Jan 1, 2010, and Dec 31, 2014. These 
data were linked at the individual patient level to 
Hospital Episode Statistics (HES), the administrative 
database of all hospital episodes in NHS hospitals in 
England.19
The study was exempt from NHS Research Ethics 
Committee approval because it involved analysis of an 
existing dataset of anonymised data for service 
evaluation.
Research in context
Evidence before this study
Several countries have introduced policies that allow patients to 
choose a specific health-care provider, with the aim of 
improving the quality of care. We did a systematic review to 
assess the evidence that patients with cancer are willing to travel 
beyond (bypass) their nearest hospital for cancer surgery, and to 
assess the effect of competition on outcomes of surgery. We 
searched PubMed and Embase for relevant articles published 
between Jan 1, 1990 and Dec 31, 2015. Search criteria are in the 
appendix. 5994 titles and abstracts were reviewed. Five studies 
had empirically assessed the mobility of patients for cancer 
surgery. Patients were attracted to hospitals that had shorter 
waiting lists, that offered advanced technology, and that had 
indicators of better service quality than other hospitals. There 
was significant heterogeneity in the design of empirical studies, 
including differences in data quality, the geographical unit of 
analysis, and limited control for the influence of price 
competition. No studies had looked at the effect of competition 
on outcomes of cancer.
Added value of this study
To our knowledge, this is the first national evaluation of the 
effect of choice and competition policies on the patterns of 
service configuration and technology adoption for cancer 
surgery. We studied travel patterns of more than 
19 000 patients who had a radical prostatectomy between 
2010 and 2014 in the National Health Service (NHS) in England. 
The mobility of men to alternative, more distant centres 
resulted in substantial changes in market share for individual 
surgical centres, which were most marked in areas of highest 
competition. Centres that lost local patients to other centres 
were at risk of closure. Patients were attracted to centres 
offering robotic surgery, and other centres adopted this 
technology to preserve their market share. We found that, 
between 2010 and 2017, there has been large-scale adoption of 
robot-assisted radical prostatectomy, increasing by three times, 
from 12 centres at the start of 2010 to 42 by 2017. During the 
same time period, 16 of the 65 NHS radical prostatectomy 
centres in England closed their prostate cancer surgery unit.
Implications of all the available evidence
Patients with cancer respond to policies that enable them to 
choose a surgical provider of their choice. In the absence of 
appropriate information about quality of care, policies based on 
patient choice and hospital competition could create incentives 
for adoption of new technologies without evidence of superior 
outcomes as hospitals look to retain and attract new patients. 
The resulting changes in market share for individual hospitals 
could threaten the viability of their surgical services.
For more on Hospital Episode 
Statistics see http://content.
digital.nhs.uk/hes
See Online for appendix
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Study design 
To define each individual patient’s residence, we used 
the population-weighted centroids of small geographical 
areas termed lower super output areas (LSOAs). These 
weightings provide location coordinates for the greatest 
population density in the LSOA. There are 34 753 of 
these small geographical areas (ie, LSOAs) in England, 
with an average population of about 1600.20 Both the 
LSOAs and full postcodes for the hospitals where the 
surgery was done were inputted into a geographical 
information system (Esri ArcGIS 10.3) to calculate 
travel times according to the fastest route by car to all 
surgical centres in England (calculated by use of the 
Ordnance Survey MasterMap Integrated Transport 
Network). Patients receiving surgery at their nearest 
centre were defined as core users. Those who did not 
receive care at their nearest surgical centre were 
classified as bypassers.
For each surgical centre, we identified the number of 
leavers—patients for whom that centre was nearest but 
who had their treatment at an NHS centre further away. 
We also identified the number of arrivers—patients for 
whom another centre was nearest but who had their 
surgery at that centre. A centre was identified as being a 
winner (ie, having a net gain of patients) or loser 
(ie, having a net loss of patients) if the difference between 
leavers and arrivers was statistically significant based on 
the conditional method for testing a difference between 
two Poisson means.21
For each surgical centre we calculated a spatial 
competition index (SCI) as a measure of external 
competition.22,23 The SCI provides a uniform metric that 
can be used across all surgical centres and that represents 
the demand for services and the availability of alternative 
hospitals. Across England, there is variation in the 
concentration of available hospitals depending on 
the degree of urbanisation or rurality. For example, the 
northeast (one of nine English regions) is a 
predominantly rural area that is 8592 km² in size and 
had three surgical centres at the start of the study period. 
Conversely, London is 1572 km² in size (and the largest 
urbanised region in Europe) and had ten surgical centres 
at the start of the study period.24
Data analysis 
In this analysis, the SCI for a surgical centre was 
calculated on the basis of both the number of eligible 
patients within a 60-min drive and the number of 
surgical centres within a 60-min drive for each eligible 
patient; in the equation shown, the surgical centre i has n 
eligible patients within a 60-min drive, and patient j in 
centre i has k surgical centres within a 60-min drive:
The SCI ranges theoretically from 0 for centres in a 
monopoly environment to a value close to 1 for centres in 
the most competitive environment.
At the start of the study period (January, 2010) there 
were 65 prostate cancer surgical centres in England, of 
which 12 centres routinely performed robot-assisted 
radical prostatectomy procedures. These centres were 
labelled as established robotic centres. An analysis of 
HES data, in addition to an organisational survey 
produced as part of the National Prostate Cancer Audit,17 
was used to evaluate the change in configuration of 
prostate cancer surgical units across England and the 
availability of robotic surgery from 2010 onwards. 
The χ² test was used to compare proportions. All analyses 
were done with Stata, version 14, to assess the effect of 
competition, as measured by the SCI, on changes in 
service configuration (expressed as net gains or losses of 
patients as defined above) and adoption of robotic 
surgery in the NHS.
Role of the funding source
The funder of the study, National Institute for Health 
Research, had no role in study design, data collection, 
data analysis, data interpretation, writing of the report, or 
the decision to submit for publication. AA and JvdM had 
full access to all the data in the study, take responsibility 
for the integrity of the data and the accuracy of the data 
analysis, and had final responsibility for the decision to 
submit for publication.
Results
We identified 19 518 men who were diagnosed with 
prostate cancer and underwent radical prostatectomy in 
SCIi=1 –
1
niΣ
ni
ji = 1
1
kji Figure 1: Flowchart of men included in the studyHES=Hospital Episode Statistics. NHS=UK National Health Service.
19 518 men with HES-linked cancer repository records 
 received radical prostatectomy from 2010 
 to 2014 
153 men excluded who lived outside 
 England: Scotland (n=8), Isle of Wight
 (n=67), Wales (n=78)
19 365 men living in England received radical 
 prostatectomy at an NHS provider in England
109 men excluded as the treatment provider
 was not a recognised NHS provider or 
 the provider was not operational on the 
 date when the surgery was done
19 256 men matched to 65 providers of prostate 
 cancer surgery
19 256 men included in final cohort
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the NHS in England between Jan 1, 2010, and Dec 31, 2014. 
Of these 19 518 men, 262 (1·3%) were excluded because 
they either lived outside England or could not be assigned 
to a particular hospital; 19 256 were eligible for inclusion 
in the study (figure 1).
Figure 2 shows the places of residence for patients who 
had their prostate cancer surgery at two selected surgical 
centres located in the east of England (figure 2A) and 
southwest England (figure 2B), both of which were 
classified as winners. Figure 3 shows the net gains and 
losses of patients for each radical prostatectomy centre 
identified during the study period. 23 (35%) of the 
65 centres were classified as winners and 37 (57%) of 65 as 
losers. Five centres did not have a statistically significant 
net gain or loss of patients. Some of the winners were 
doing 400 to 500 more procedures than expected if they 
had only been operating on local men for whom this was 
the nearest centre. Conversely, some of the losers were 
doing approximately 200 fewer procedures than expected 
(and 400 fewer in the case of one centre).
Figure 3 also shows the relationship between, on the 
one hand, radical prostatectomy centres having a net 
gain or net loss of patients and, on the other hand, being 
an established robotic centre or a centre that closed 
during the study period. Centres with a net gain were 
Figure 2: Mobility patterns of patients receiving radical prostate cancer surgery at two selected NHS cancer centres
Maps of the UK, illustrating the mobility pattern of patients who received radical prostate cancer surgery at two selected National Health Service (NHS) cancer 
centres (indicated with a + symbol in the area of core users) located in the east of England (A) and southwest England (B) that had a net gain of patients from 
outside their local area (ie, more arrivers than leavers). Both centres were established robotic centres. The maps include a scaled magnification of the region 
inset. Contains National Statistics data, © Crown copyright and database right 2017; NHS Research Scotland (NRS) data, © Crown copyright and database right 
2017; Ordnance Survey data © Crown copyright and database right 2017; and Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency data. 
Figure 3: Net gains and losses of patients for each radical prostatectomy centre (n=65) during the study 
period 
Established robotic radical prostatectomy centres (n=12) shown in green and centres that closed during the 
2010–14 study period (n=10) shown in red. Centres in blue are centres that were neither robotic radical 
prostectomy centres nor centres that closed during the study period.
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more likely to be established robotic centres (ten [43%] of 
the 23 winners were robotic centres, compared with 
two [5%] of the 37 centres with a net loss; p=0·0043). 
Conversely, ten (27%) of the 37 centres with a net loss of 
patients closed down during the study period.
Centres with the largest net gains or losses were 
predominantly located in the most competitive areas 
(figure 4). Established robotic centres were most likely 
to be located in the highest quartile (SCI 0·87–0·92) for 
hospital competition. Seven (41%) of the 17 centres in 
the highest SCI quartile were established robotic 
centres compared with five (10%) of the 48 other centres 
in the three other quartiles (p=0·0050). Similarly, for 
centre closures, six (35%) of the 17 centres in the 
highest SCI quartile closed compared with four (8%) of 
the 48 other centres (p=0·0081). 
Both the analysis of HES and the results of the 
national organisational survey showed profound 
changes in the organisation and practices of prostate 
cancer surgical care that continued beyond the end of 
the study period (figure 5). Between 2010 and 2017, 
there has been large-scale adoption of robotic surgery, 
increasing by three times, from 12 (18%) of 65 centres 
open at the start of 2010 to 39 (71%) of 55 centres open 
in 2014 to 42 (86%) of 49 in 2017. In the same time 
period, 16 (25%) of the 65 NHS radical prostatectomy 
centres in England closed. Both the closures and the 
rapid and widespread adoption of robotic surgery have 
been unforeseen, effectively rendering commissioning 
guidelines—published only in 2015 and recommending 
phased introduction of robotics for prostate cancer 
surgery within the NHS—obsolete.25
Discussion
Our results suggest that, during the study period 
analysed, patient choice and hospital competition, rather 
than a coordinated policy towards centralisation, have 
been drivers in the changing configuration of surgical 
cancer services. The proportion of patients who bypassed 
their nearest hospital to have prostate cancer surgery 
elsewhere has been far larger than the 5–10% considered 
to be necessary in the health economics literature to 
incentivise improvements in hospital quality.26
In the absence of data on outcomes, the mobility of 
patients has been driven by factors such as availability 
of advanced surgical technology and the reputation 
of individual hospitals and clinicians.18 The resulting 
competition between hospitals has contributed to the 
closure of radical prostatectomy centres in the NHS in 
England and widespread adoption of robot-assisted 
radical prostatectomy as centres have had to respond to 
potential changes in their market share, which threatened 
both their income and their ability to meet minimum 
procedure volume requirements. This finding indicates 
that patient choice and hospital competition, although 
rarely considered in redesign of cancer services, are 
potentially powerful drivers of service change, even 
within publicly funded systems. It is unlikely that these 
findings are limited to the NHS in England or to prostate 
cancer surgery alone.
From a wider system perspective, the geographical layout 
of cancer services means that not all centres face the same 
competitive pressures and, in turn, will respond differently 
to choice and competition policies as mechanisms for 
quality improvement. For example, ten of the 12 established 
robotic centres or early adopters of robotics were located in 
the most competitive areas. However, we found that 
patients were prepared to travel substantial distances for 
treatment, in some cases bypassing several surgical units, 
which means that even centres within less competitive 
areas face some level of external competition for patients 
and subsequently become late adopters of technology to 
retain local patients.27
Figure 4: Effect of competition on the net gain or loss of patients for each radical prostatectomy centre 
during the study period
The size of the circles corresponds to the number of men expected to have surgery at the centre. Red circles 
correspond to centres that closed during the study period (2010–14). Green circles correspond to established 
robotic centres. Blue circles correspond to centres that were neither robotic radical prostectomy centres nor centres 
that closed during the study period. Spatial competition index (SCI) score 0=hospital facing weakest competition. 
SCI score 1=hospital facing strongest competition. 
Figure 5: Changes in the number of robotic centres and total number of 
centres in the NHS in England (2009–17)
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Attempts to coordinate cancer care services through 
centralisation and regionalisation have largely ignored the 
fact that patients are prepared to bypass their local services 
for treatment. This occurrence is partly due to the paucity 
of empirical evidence about the extent of patient 
mobility.28–30 Additionally, cancer care plans have exerted 
limited control of the available services and technology at 
the individual hospital level (eg, introduction of new 
devices and practices of care), which can serve as proxy 
measures of quality in the absence of quality indicators.31
Substantial levels of patient mobility mean that centres 
need to compete with other providers to meet minimum 
procedure volume thresholds as set down by national 
policy.16 In England, each prostate cancer surgery centre 
is expected to do a specified number of operations 
per year or face the threat of closure.15,32 Competition 
policies have therefore stimulated a form of centralisation 
through natural selection, as centres act to protect their 
status as a cancer surgery centre, rather than through a 
coordinated process based on valid indicators of quality. 
Similar effects have been observed in the US health-care 
market, where both acute and non-acute care services 
have closed in response to competition.33,34 It is unclear 
whether these effects have improved the quality of care.
None of the centres that closed during the study period 
did so because of explicit evidence of poor quality. 
Instead, the closures appear to have been influenced by 
the decisions of individual patients in selecting their 
health-care provider. Further research is required to 
establish what effect the observed pattern of closures has 
had on travel times, outcomes, and equity in access to 
surgical services for the most vulnerable groups, given 
their decreased ability to travel.28,35
The patterns of patient mobility observed occurred at a 
time when comparative outcome measures for prostate 
cancer surgery were not available. This observation 
highlights that providers of cancer services, just like any 
other industry, will consider the use of alternative 
incentives to attract or retain patients.36–38 Patients will 
gravitate to places that make themselves attractive and by 
doing so they will create centres that treat large numbers 
of patients, which itself will attract further patients.39
Patients with prostate cancer were more likely to travel 
to centres that were early adopters of robot-assisted 
radical prostatectomy, showing the powerful effect of 
advanced technology on perceptions of quality. The 
result of this travel pattern has been that other centres 
have invested in costly robotic surgery to avoid losing 
their patients to other centres and to maintain their 
market share to preserve their cancer centre status, 
despite a scarcity of evidence for the superiority of this 
surgical procedure with respect to functional and 
oncological outcomes.40,41 Notably, none of the centres that 
adopted robotic surgery closed down. Similar patterns 
have been observed in other health-care markets across 
the USA and Europe, with cancer centres adopting 
robotic surgery to increase their market share.36,42–44
Our previous systematic review of the literature on 
patient choice and competition28 identified five empirical 
studies in high-income settings showing that patients 
with several tumour types, including breast, bladder, 
gastric, colorectal, and thoracic cancers, were prepared to 
bypass their nearest surgical centre.45–50 The availability of 
advanced surgical techniques, procedure volume, and 
both surgeon and hospital reputation were identified as 
key drivers for patient mobility. Patients of advanced age 
and from low socioeconomic backgrounds were less 
likely to consider alternatives than those who were 
younger and more affluent.
Hospital competition, rather than the pursuit of better 
quality care by itself, is also cited as a major factor 
influencing the adoption of new technologies and 
diversifying individual practices of care for both cancer 
surgery and radiotherapy.51 There is growing evidence of 
rapid adoption of technology for cancer surgery across a 
range of cancer types, beyond prostate cancer, such as 
renal, colorectal, and gynaecological cancer surgery.36,52–55 
For radiotherapy, where one would expect potentially less 
patient mobility than is normally observed for services 
because of the protracted duration of radiotherapy 
regimens, the past decade has also seen a substantial 
increase in the use of an array of high-cost technologies.41 
These technologies have included intensity-modulated 
radiotherapy, stereotactic-beam radiotherapy, and 
proton-beam therapy, with providers trying to gain a 
competitive advantage over others.51
The question as to whether competition can stimulate 
improvements in outcomes of cancer surgery remains 
unanswered. Two studies have analysed the effect of 
hospital competition on the pricing of pancreatic cancer56 
and colon cancer57 surgery, and one study assessed the 
effect of such competition on the efficiency of cancer care 
delivery across tumour types in the US cancer health-care 
market.58 Studies across other specialties have shown 
mixed results for the effect of fixed-price markets on 
improvements in health-care quality. 8,23,59–66
The dearth of studies on patient mobility in both 
high-income and emerging economies is a major 
limitation for evidenced-based policy making to decide 
how best to balance patient choice and top-down policy 
approaches to service coordination in cancer care. We 
have highlighted potential approaches for management 
of this health system challenge.
For patients, having choice over their treatment or how 
a specific treatment is given might be more important 
than having a choice over the actual service provider.67 
Therefore, differences in availability of technology at the 
local level, even within a system that publishes validated 
outcome measures, can contribute to shifts in market 
share.28 Investment in medical devices for cancer care51 
seems to be driven predominantly by individual clinicians 
and clinical departments, possibly because the regulatory 
hurdles for adoption of new devices are relatively low 
compared with those of medicines.31,68
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The use of health technology assessment processes or 
value frameworks for all new technologies across the 
cancer care spectrum (ie, medicines, radio therapy, and 
surgery) would act as a meaningful first step towards 
providing stronger guidance on which inter ventions are 
likely to deliver the greatest value to patients and 
society.69,70 Other options for coordination of technology 
adoption include coverage with evidence development 
schemes or establishment of nationally designated 
research centres to trial new technologies before 
considering reimbursement.71 However, a significant 
time lag remains before functional and oncological 
outcomes will be available to inform national 
implementation, especially for conditions with a lengthy 
disease course—such as prostate cancer.
Competition between hospitals will continue 
irrespective of attempts to centralise cancer services. 
Whether public reporting of performance indicators 
could help to achieve improvements in care quality 
through competition is debatable.72 It might never be 
feasible to develop meaningful indicators for some 
tumour types. For example, the appropriateness of many 
available indicators is problematic because they can only 
be published after a long lag period (eg, side-effects and 
survival rates at 1 and 5 years), during which clinical 
practice can change substantially.73 Additionally, there is 
little evidence to suggest that individuals are more likely 
to use published performance indicators than proxies 
for quality, such as a hospital’s or clinician’s reputation.74,75
However, in the absence of any indicator, hospitals will 
try to differentiate themselves to attract new users, and 
patients will continue to be reliant on lay sources of 
information, including industry marketing.76 This 
observation strengthens the need to develop and provide 
access to performance indicators across different tumour 
types to inform patients’ decision making. Performance 
indicators are publicly available for oesophageal and 
bowel cancer surgery in the NHS.77,78 Additionally, the 
National Prostate Cancer Audit has completed a national 
Patient Reported Outcome Measures (PROMs) collection 
exercise for men following radical surgery or radiotherapy, 
with the aim of reporting risk-adjusted outcomes at the 
individual hospital level.79 Public reporting of outcomes 
would mean that quality improvement could be 
stimulated through hospitals competing for market share 
or aiming to avoid reputational losses.80,81
Finally, the configuration of cancer services needs to 
account for existing patterns of patient mobility, hospital 
capacity, catchment areas, and clinical quality. To this 
end, location-allocation modelling provides a rigorous 
empirical approach to optimising the configuration of 
health-care services (including decisions about service 
centralisation).82,83 For example, it can guide which 
centres should close to maximise outcomes, or minimise 
travel distances for those individuals who face difficulties 
in accessing services because of financial and physical 
constraints.82,84
A limitation of our study is that we used centroids of 
the LSOAs as the representation of the patients’ 
residence. This will have added noise to the determination 
of centres’ net gain and net loss of patients. It is likely 
that this noise has attenuated rather than enhanced the 
observed relationships between spatial competition and 
technology adoption on the one hand and patient 
mobility on the other.
In conclusion, we show that patient choice and hospital 
competition can have a major influence on the 
configuration of cancer services. The challenge for health 
systems is to balance choice and competition with service 
centralisation, but there is a paucity of empirical evidence 
to inform this decision making. Our study highlights the 
need to have robust quality performance and outcome 
measures available to patients and referring health 
centres, to avoid reliance on often misleading surrogate 
indicators. Otherwise, choice and competition policies 
could seriously limit rather than facilitate health services’ 
ability to deliver equitable and affordable improvements 
in cancer outcomes.
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Is competition bad for our health(care)? We simply don’t know
In The Lancet Oncology, Ajay Aggarwal and colleagues1 
apply innovative analytics to study the movement 
patterns of almost 20 000 patients accessing prostate 
cancer surgery across the National Health Service (NHS) 
in England between 2010 and 2014. They find that, in 
the presence of pressures to centralise surgical services 
and intense competition, and in the absence of any 
publicly accessible measure of service quality to allow 
comparisons, those providers who invest in high tech, 
in this case robotic, surgery equipment, fare better than 
those who don’t in attracting patients and growing their 
business. In fact, those who don’t, risk closure. One in four 
of the country’s 65 radical prostatectomy centres closed 
between 2010 and 2017, with a trebling of the number of 
robotic centres over the same period. None of the 16 NHS 
centres that closed had invested in robotic equipment. 
Nor had any of the centres that closed done so because 
of explicit evidence of poorer quality. Moreover, in a 
previous analysis of referral patterns for specialised 
prostate cancer surgery,2 the same authors showed that 
patients who travel longer distances, bypassing their 
local centres, tend to be younger, less ill, and of higher 
socioeconomic background than those who do not. 
The authors conclude that, in the absence of any 
other reliable measure of quality or patient experience, 
patients are attracted by technology, contributing to 
what they describe as a natural selection process that 
shapes the market and has, thus far, unconfirmed effects 
on equity, overall cost, or outcomes. Do competitive 
pressures end up undermining the NHS’s best efforts 
(perhaps through the National Institute for Health 
and Care Excellence [NICE] or professional guidelines 
and commissioning guides) to coordinate the system 
to make it more efficient and effective and, ideally, 
more equitable? Are patients misled by high tech and 
smart marketing by providers investing in it? And, 
most importantly perhaps, do patients exerting choice 
actually lead to better outcomes, and if so, for what type 
of patient and at what price for the NHS?
The answer is that we simply do not know (for now). 
The authors’ analysis matters because it forces us to ask 
all these questions, especially the “so what” question, 
when it comes to patient mobility and the competition 
policies that (inadvertently or not) trigger it. More 
questions emerge: what is the role of central entities 
such as NHS England or norm setters such as NICE in 
management of service configuration and informing 
patient choice? Health Technology Assessment (HTA) 
has been widely applied to pharmaceuticals through 
NICE, but much less so to technologies such as surgical 
interventions. Paradoxically, the only NICE programme 
not to consider value for money is the interventional 
procedures’ guidance, under which surgery, including 
robotic surgery, is most likely to fall. Could NICE help 
providers to make decisions about major investment 
in high tech such as robots? Or would a more realistic 
approach be to invite bids from providers, as was the 
case with proton beam therapy, where NHS England 
set out its specification and Trusts responded, with the 
successful ones selected through a competitive process? 
An alternative to such top-down central planning 
might be to expand personal health budgets to actively 
encourage patients to shop around, hence promoting 
patient choice. But most would agree that health care is 
not a usual marketplace,3 and regulation and information 
are both needed to make meaningful choices.
Somewhat depressingly, the authors are sceptical about 
the potential of developing an adequate measure of 
outcomes to benchmark providers and complement, if 
not substitute, technology-based marketing. In the NHS 
at least, political challenges due to inertia, confusion, or 
just not enough money and people to think about it all, 
may well outweigh the methodological challenges cited 
by the authors, such as the time lag between treatment 
and real outcomes. The NHS Patient Reported Outcomes 
Measures programme, having stalled after an impressive 
start a few years back, is a case in point.4
Reading through the conclusions, parallels can be drawn 
with another case where the latest technology seemed to 
drive policy and investment. The Cancer Drugs Fund (CDF) 
in England favours the latest cancer drugs, specifically 
those shown not to be good value for money by NICE, 
at the expense of drugs for other diseases or indeed non-
drug cancer interventions such as radiotherapy or surgery, 
as concluded recently by the same authors.5 Despite a 
recent revamp, CDF remains a missed opportunity for 
generation of data on comparative effectiveness to 
inform patient and professional choice.6
In summary, this is a valuable study revealing the 
usually ad-hoc nature of policy making and its usually 
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unstudied implications on people’s behaviour, which 
in turn influences health spending, outcomes, and 
distribution. It should not be read as an ideologically 
driven call for increased top-down control and central 
planning. Instead, the authors offer a strong rationale 
for collecting and sharing data on (comparative) 
outcomes to inform investment choices at the central 
and provider level, as well as treatment choices by 
patients and their doctors. Although controversial, 
rightly structured competition could save lives.7,8 We 
simply do not know— but we must try to find out.
Kalipso Chalkidou
Institute of Global Health Innovation, Imperial College London, 
London SW7 2AZ, UK 
K.chalkidou@imperial.ac.uk
I declare no competing interests.
Copyright © The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an Open Access 
article under the CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license. 
1 Aggarwal A, Lewis D, Mason M, Purushotham A, Sullivan R, 
van der Meulen J. Effect of patient choice and hospital competition on 
service configuration and technology adoption within cancer surgery: 
a national, population-based study. Lancet Oncol 2017; published online 
Oct 3. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1470-2045(17)30572-7.
2 Aggarwal A, Lewis D, Charman SC, et al. Determinants of patient mobility 
for prostate cancer surgery: a population based study of choice and 
competition. Eur Urol 2017; published online Jul 29. DOI:10.1016/j.
eururo.2017.07.013.
3 Arrow K. Uncertainty and the welfare economics of medical care. 
Am Econ Rev 1963; 53: 941–73.
4 Devlin N, Appleby J, Parkin D. Why has the PROMs programme stalled? 
Dec 3, 2014. The BMJ Opinion http://blogs.bmj.com/bmj/2014/12/03/
nancy-devlin-john-appleby-david-parkin-why-has-the-proms-
programme-stalled/ (accessed Aug 9, 2017).
5 Aggarwal A, Fojo T, Chamberlain C, Davis C, Sullivan R. Do patient access 
schemes for high-cost cancer drugs deliver value to society?—lessons from 
the NHS Cancer Drugs Fund. Ann Oncol 2017; 28: 1738–50.
6 Grieve R, Abrams K, Claxton K, et al. Cancer Drugs Fund requires further 
reform. BMJ 2016; 354: i5090.
7 Bloom N, Cooper Z, Gaynor M, et al. In defence of our research on 
competition in England’s National Health Service. Lancet 2011; 
378: 2064–65; author reply 2065.
8 Bloom N, Propper C, Seiler S, Van Reenen J. The impact of competition on 
management quality: evidence from public hospitals. Rev Econ Stud 2015; 
82: 457–89. 
